The Stablecoin Sandwich

The cross-border payment industry has quietly standardized on a single architecture: fiat in, stablecoin transit, fiat out. Nobody voted on it. It won because the economics work and the alternatives don't.

By , Founder · Plexo Institute

The cross border payment industry has quietly standardized on one architecture: fiat in, stablecoin transit, fiat out.

The stablecoin sandwich is the emergent operating model of cross-border payments: fiat in, stablecoin transit, fiat out.

Reading Guide

Four ideas to anchor the read.

Correspondent banking requires bilateral relationships that scale with corridor count. The sandwich collapses that complexity to one licensed operator relationship plus one shared settlement rail. Settlement compresses from 3-5 days to under 10 minutes, increasing capital turnover by 30-100x. The third property makes the model politically tractable in markets with anti-crypto politics: end users transact only in local fiat, while the stablecoin is invisible and the compliance burden lands on the licensed operator.

SWIFT gpi already delivers minutes-level settlement at low cost between many G7 banks, so the sandwich captures only marginal share there. G7-to-EM flows are contested because correspondent banking still functions in major Africa and LATAM corridors, though it is contracting. EM-to-EM regional flows that previously routed through New York USD intermediation compress to one stablecoin hop plus two fiat legs. EM-to-EM exotic corridors with no direct correspondent are overwhelming sandwich territory wherever licensed operators exist on both ends.

Visa on-chain analytics and BVNK put 2024 adjusted stablecoin transaction volume around $5-6T. FXC cautions that public stablecoin data does not cleanly isolate cross-border payment use, so this is a scale signal, not evidence that the same amount is payment-specific or sandwich-specific flow. The regulatory operating perimeter is established by 8+ jurisdictions, including MiCA in the EU, the GENIUS Act in the US, UAE PTSR and ADGM FRT, MAS PSA in Singapore, UK FSMA, Hong Kong, Japan, and others with operating frameworks. The sandwich is past pilot scale, but the exact sandwich share needs a dedicated market-sizing source.

Off-ramp dependency matters where licensing is unclear, including parts of Francophone Africa, Central Asia, and the Caribbean. Institutional preference matters above the typical $5-10M flow threshold, where counterparties often default to SWIFT with documented banking relationships. Fragmented compliance matters because each operator still runs its own Travel Rule, sanctions screening, and AML stack. The next architectural upgrade is a shared compliance layer.

Chapter 1

The Architecture That Won

The stablecoin sandwich is not a theoretical design. It is the operating model already used across retreating corridors.

The stablecoin sandwich is the emergent operating model of the cross-border payment industry. Look at HoneyCoin, BVNK, Conduit, Yellow Card, StraitsX, Bitso, 1inch Pay, and dozens of licensed operators across emerging-market corridors. They all run the same flow: accept local fiat, transit through stablecoin, deliver local fiat.

The sandwich beat every alternative because it survives the three tests every corridor faces: regulatory tolerability, liquidity access, and cost economics.

~$5.7T
adjusted stablecoin transaction volume in 2024; not pure sandwich payment volume [1][2].
8+
jurisdictions with operating frameworks that explicitly accommodate this model [3].

The architecture is simple enough to describe in one sentence and deep enough to reshape corridor economics: the sender pays local fiat, a licensed on-ramp converts to stablecoin, the token transits on-chain, a licensed off-ramp converts to destination fiat, and the recipient receives local fiat. The Fiat Sandwich explains the architecture in technical depth.

Chapter 2

Why This Model Wins

Three properties make the sandwich economically dominant where correspondent banking has retreated.

The sandwich wins because it solves problems the alternatives cannot solve simultaneously. It avoids a correspondent chain, turns capital faster, and keeps customers in local fiat while placing compliance on licensed operators.

The Asset Moves, The User Experience Stays Fiat


Stablecoins carry settlement between operators while both customers stay in local currency.

Sender

Pays local fiat

Customer experience starts in domestic currency.

Origin operator

Compliance and conversion

The licensed operator assembles the payment and touches the token.

Shared rail

Stablecoin transit

The asset moves between operators, not customer balances.

Exposureoperator layer only

Destination operator

Off-ramp and payout

The licensed endpoint converts back into local liquidity.

Recipient

Receives local fiat

The beneficiary never needs the token.

Scenario complexity190 pairs -> 20 licenses + one railModelled capital turn3-5 days -> minutesCompliance ownerLicensed operators, not customers

Correspondent banking requires bilateral relationships: Bank A must negotiate a nostro account with Bank B, with KYC, credit line, settlement terms, and pricing. Building a 20-corridor network means 190 bilateral relationships.

The sandwich replaces this with a hub-and-spoke model. Each licensed operator connects to the stablecoin rail. Any operator on the rail can transact with any other operator on the rail. Building a 20-corridor network means 20 operator licenses plus one shared rail. The combinatorial complexity collapses.

A sandwich payment completes end-to-end, excluding local banking delays, in minutes. The transit leg is seconds to a few minutes depending on chain. Compared to 3-5 day average correspondent settlement, this compresses working capital requirements by the same ratio.

For a B2B operator processing $100M per month, moving from 3-day to 10-minute settlement frees approximately $10M of working capital. At a 15% cost of capital, typical in emerging markets, that is about $1.5M per year in recoverable capital cost. This is the capital efficiency dividend that accrues to every participant in the architecture.

The end user on both sides of the payment works exclusively in local currency. Sender pays naira; recipient receives yuan. The stablecoin is invisible to both. This property is what makes the sandwich regulatorily tractable in jurisdictions with no-crypto populist politics: the citizen never buys or holds crypto.

The compliance burden lands on the licensed operator, which is where regulators want it. The operator is identified, supervised, and subject to Travel Rule. The citizen transacts in their home currency, exactly as before.

Chapter 3

Where the Sandwich Succeeds

The sandwich wins most decisively where traditional infrastructure has retreated.

The sandwich is not dominant in G7-to-G7 flows where SWIFT gpi operates efficiently. It is dominant where gpi does not reach, especially EM-to-EM corridors that previously required USD intermediation through New York.

Corridor typeTraditional infrastructureSandwich position

G7-to-G7

SWIFT gpi: minutes, cheap, well-integrated

Marginal share; fintechs use internal netting instead

G7-to-EM

Correspondent banking: 1-3 days, 1-3%

Growing, especially in Africa and LATAM corridors

EM-to-EM regional

Often no direct correspondent; routes via USD through New York

Dominant; the sandwich replaces the USD intermediation hop

EM-to-EM exotic

May take 4-6 days, 4-8% cost

Overwhelming share where licensed operators exist on both ends

The corridors where the sandwich delivers the most value are EM-to-EM flows that previously required USD intermediation. A payment from Kenya to the Philippines under the old model could route KES to USD through Nairobi, London, and New York, then USD to PHP through New York and Manila. Five hops, 3-5 days, and 3-6% total cost.

Under the sandwich, KES converts to USDT through a licensed Kenyan operator, then USDT converts to PHP through a licensed Philippines operator. One hop of stablecoin transit plus two fiat legs. About 10 minutes. About 1.5-3% cost.

The efficiency gain is not incremental. It is order-of-magnitude.

Chapter 4

Where the Sandwich Struggles

The model has three structural weaknesses, and each constrains how far the architecture can expand.

The sandwich has real limits. It depends on legal off-ramps, it still faces institutional preference for banking rails on high-value flows, and it has not yet solved compliance coordination at network scale.

The sandwich requires a licensed off-ramp in every destination country. Where licensing regimes are unclear, restrictive, or absent, including much of Francophone Africa, parts of Central Asia, and some Caribbean states, the off-ramp is informal or unavailable. The architecture degrades back to P2P OTC, which has its own reliability and compliance issues.

Expansion of the sandwich footprint is gated on regulatory modernization in destination markets. This is progress operators cannot accelerate on their own.

For flows above certain thresholds, typically $5-10M institutional transactions, counterparties often prefer SWIFT with documented banking relationships. Not because the sandwich is slower or more expensive, but because legal enforceability and chain-of-custody documentation are perceived as stronger through banks.

This perception gap should close over time as regulated stablecoin frameworks mature and courts establish precedent. Today, the sandwich addressable market still skews toward sub-$5M transactions.

The sandwich solved the settlement problem. It has not yet solved the compliance coordination problem. Today, two operators settling through stablecoin each run their own Travel Rule, sanctions screening, and AML logic. Data flows through bilateral integrations.

This works at current scale but will not scale to thousands of operators across hundreds of corridors. The next architectural upgrade is a shared compliance layer, which is what multilateral clearing networks provide. Six Pathways explains how operators evolve from bilateral sandwich to multilateral clearing.

Chapter 5

The Economic Inevitability

The sandwich won because the alternatives were structurally disadvantaged.

This is worth stating plainly: the sandwich is not a fashion. It is the economic equilibrium for a world where correspondent banking retreats from emerging markets and stablecoin liquidity is deep on both ends of a corridor.

Direct correspondent banking requires bilateral relationships that banks no longer maintain in contracting corridors. The supply has dried up.

Fintech local accounts, the Wise model, require banking access in every corridor, which is exactly what many emerging markets do not provide to fintechs.

Bilateral crypto requires both sender and recipient to operate in crypto. That is not viable for most B2B flows.

Tokenized deposit networks, including JPM Kinexys and Partior, are restricted to participating banks. That excludes many emerging-market counterparties.

The sandwich is the residual architecture: the model that works when none of the alternatives do. In EM-to-EM corridors, that makes it the default.

Chapter 6

Counter-Arguments & Limitations

Where the sandwich-as-equilibrium thesis can be challenged.

Two objections matter before treating the sandwich as a settled architecture. Tokenized bank deposits may absorb some high-value B2B flows. Sovereign backlash may also close off-ramps in specific receiving markets. Both are real enough to keep inside the argument.

The absorption case is that regulated banks have settlement finality, deposit insurance, and existing institutional relationships that stablecoin operators cannot match. As JPM Kinexys, Partior, Fnality, and similar networks reach more corridors, B2B counterparties may migrate from stablecoin sandwich to tokenized deposit settlement for legal-certainty advantages. The sandwich institutional ceiling around $5-10M per transaction is exactly where tokenized deposits have the strongest comparative advantage.

The counter-counter is that tokenized deposit networks have been promised since 2018 and have reached scale only in narrow G7 corridors. Their structural constraint is participating-bank exclusivity: emerging-market counterparties without G7 bank relationships cannot access them. The sandwich serves the EM-to-EM market that tokenized deposits structurally cannot reach; the architectures are complementary in different segments rather than substitutes in the same one.

The backlash case is that stablecoin politics swing with administration changes. A wave of emerging-market governments restricting stablecoin off-ramps could remove operating perimeters faster than proactive jurisdictions add them. The sandwich depends on legal off-ramps in destination markets. If those close, the architecture degrades to informal P2P with different reliability and compliance properties.

The counter-counter is that the global regulatory direction in 2024-2026 has been toward formalization, not restriction. MiCA, the GENIUS Act, UAE PTSR, MAS PSA, ADGM FRT, and UK FSMA all establish stablecoin operating frameworks with clear compliance requirements. Backlash risk is real for individual corridors, but systemic backlash that closes the sandwich globally would require a coordinated regulatory reversal that is not currently visible.

About the Author

Anton Titov

Author of The Stablecoin Sandwich. Building a stablecoin clearing network, solving interoperability between licensed financial institutions across stablecoins, chains, and jurisdictions. He focuses on connecting payment infrastructure between emerging and developed markets. Speaker at Money20/20 Asia 2025, Stablecoin Summit Africa (Johannesburg, 2025), Stablecoin & Blockchain Conference Kenya (2026), and Fintech Week Central Europe (2026).

About This Perspective

Scope, disclosure, and method.

This perspective is written from Plexo's point of view as an operator building regulated multi-stablecoin clearing infrastructure for cross-border B2B settlement. Plexo operates as a sandwich-architecture operator focused on the EM-to-EM corridors this article identifies as the model's dominant segment. Readers should weigh that framing accordingly. The same analytical lens applies to Plexo and should be applied.

Data vintage: 2024-2026. The analysis is based on architectural observation of licensed operator disclosures, including HoneyCoin, BVNK, Conduit, Yellow Card, StraitsX, Bitso, 1inch Pay, Kotani Pay, and others; corridor-level cost comparisons from BVNK Blockchain Cross-Border Payments (2025); Visa on-chain analytics; and published case studies. Regulatory framework mapping uses EY Global Approaches to Stablecoin Regulation (September 2025) and primary regulatory texts including MiCA, the GENIUS Act, UAE PTSR, MAS PSA, ADGM FRT, and UK FSMA. Counter-views on tokenized bank deposit absorption and sovereign backlash on off-ramps are addressed above. This perspective is not investment, tax, or regulatory advice.

Relevant Reading

The Fiat Sandwich - the architecture in technical depth.

Six Pathways - the full landscape of settlement models.

The Dollarization Myth - why transit does not create store-of-value dollarization.

References

3 references
  1. Visa on-chain analytics; Blockchain Cross-Border PaymentsVisa / BVNK
  2. The State of Stablecoins in Cross-Border Payments: 2025 PrimerFXC Intelligence
  3. Global Approaches to Stablecoin RegulationEY